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COMMENTS
ELECTRONIC EAVESDROPPING UNDER THE FOURTH AMENDMENT
-AFTER BERGER AND KATZ
I. INTRODUCTION
Two cases recently decided by the United States Supreme Court have effec-
tively revised the existing law with respect to legal methods of electronic sur-
veillance.' Berger v. New York2 involved the rse of eavesdropping devices placed
by New York County law enforcement officials, pursuant to New York law, in
the offices of an attorney and a prospective applicant for a liquor license. These
devices were used to overhear conversations related to a conspiracy to bribe
officials of the State Liquor Authority.3 Conversations which were overheard and
recorded through the use of these devices were used by the prosecution to obtain
the indictment and conviction of defendant as a "go-between" for the principal
conspirators. In Katz v. United Statds,4 federal officers had attached a listening
device to the outside of a public telephone booth, in order to overhear the peti-
tioner's end of certain telephone conversations. The use of the recorded conver-
sations at trial led to his conviction for "transmitting wagering information by
telephone"5 in violation of a federal statute.6
In Berger, the Court held the New York statute authorizing issuance of
eavesdropping orders unconstitutional as permitting a trespassory intrusion into
a constitutionally protected area, in violation of the fourth and fourteenth
amendments. Subsequently, in reversing the petitioner's conviction in Katz, the
Court reinterpreted its meaning of "constitutionally protected area" and rejected
the traditional "trespass standard," extending the individual's right to privacy
to any situation where electronic surveillance techniques were used without a
proper warrant.
The purpose of this Comment is to show the impact of these decisions on
the existing law regarding eavesdropping and wiretapping, and the implications
arising from these decisions. Some emphasis will be given to the effect in New
York State as a result of these decisions, and to proposals which have been made
in an effort to comply with the mandate of the Supreme Court.
1. Berger v. New York, 388 U.S. 41 (1967); Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347
(1967).
2, 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
3. The use of the devices was authorized by ex parte orders for eavesdropping obtained
pursuant to N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a (Supp. 1067). This statute prbrides:
An ex parte order for eavesdropping ...may be issued by any judge bf the
Supreme Court . ..upon oath or affirmation of the District Attorney .. . that
there is reasonable grounds to believe that evidence of crime may be thus ob-
tained, and particularly describing the person ...whose communications, conver-
sations, or discussions are to be overheard.
4. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
54 Id. at 348.
6. 18 U.S.C. § 1084 (1964). This statute in part prohibits the use of a wire com-
munication facility for "the transmission in interstate commerce . . . of bets or wagers .. .
on any sporting event or contest."
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II. HISTORiCAL BACKGROUND
During the Eighteenth Century, English law permitted the issuance of((general warrants" to assist in control over the press. These warrants permitted
officers of the Crown to search premises and seize goods without specifying the
purpose of the search, the name of the person whose property was the object
of the search, or the materials which were to be seized.7 The American colonies
also authorized general searches by "writs of assistance" used in the regulation
of trade. These writs gave colonial customs officials complete discretion to search
in any suspected places for goods imported in violation of the British tax laws.8
The outrage and resentment caused by the general warrants in England and
the writs of assistance in the colonies are reflected in the words of the fourth
amendment. This amendment prohibits general searches, and establishes "the
right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and ef-
fects .... "9 The United States Supreme Court expanded this purpose in Boyd
v. United States,10 stating that the principles of the fourth amendment
•.. apply to all invasions on the part of the government and its em-
ployees of the sanctity of a man's home and the privacies of life. It is
not the breaking of his doors, and the rummaging of his drawers, that
constitutes the ... offence; but it is the invasion of his indefeasible
right of personal security, personal liberty and personal property,
where that right has never been forfeited by his conviction of some
public offense .... 11
The fourth amendment protection from unreasonable searches and seizures is
an implicit recognition of individual freedom and privacy, declared to be essen-
tial to constitutional liberty and as imperative as the "other fundamental rights
of the individual citizen .... "12 The fourth amendment limits the courts and
federal officials in the exercise of their power. In Weeks v. United States,18 the
defendant's home was searched and his personal papers seized by police acting
without a search warrant. The Court stated:
The tendency of those who execute the criminal laws of the country to
obtain conviction by means of unlawful seizures . . . should find no
7. See generally N. Lasson, The History and Development of the Fourth Amendment
18-50 (1939).
8. Id. at 51-78.
9. The complete text of the fourth amendment reads: "The right of the people to
be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable searches and
seizures, shall not be violated, and no warrants shall issue, but upon probable cause,
supported by oath or affirmation and particularly describing the place to be searched and
the persons or things to be seized." For a general discussion of the history of the fourth
amendment see J. Landynski, Search and Seizure and the Supreme Court 19-39 (1966) ; 3.
Schuster, Electronic Eavesdropping and the Fourth Amendment 5-11 (1965). See also Com-
ment, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 355, 364-66 (1966).
10. 116 U.S. 616 (1886).
11. Id. at 630.
12. Ker v. California, 374 U.S. 23, 32 (1963); Gouled v. United States, 255 U.S. 298,
304 (1921). Cf. Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 65-68 (1932). See also Griswold v. Connecti-
cut, 381 U.S. 479 (1965). See generally Long, The Right to Privacy: The Case Against the
Government, 10 St. Louis U.L.J. 1 (1965).
13. Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383 (1914).
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sanctions in the judgments of the courts which are charged at all times
with the support of the Constitution and to which people... have a
right to appeal for the maintenance of such fundamental rights.14
Consequently the Court held that all evidence obtained in violation of the
fourth amendment would be excluded in federal trials.15 The Court has since
demanded a strict adherence to the command of Weeks, and has ruled that in-
direct as well as direct use of tangible evidence obtained by illegal means shall
be prohibited.16 The Court, however, refused to apply this "exclusionary rule"
to the states 17 until 1961, when Mapp v. Ohio'8 held that "all evidence obtained
by searches and seizures in violation of the Constitution is . . inadmissible in
a state court."' 9
The question of whether the fourth amendment applied to intangible, as
well as tangible, objects was first decided in Olmstead v. United States,2 0 the
first wiretapping case to reach the Supreme Court. Telephone conversations
between Olmstead and others were intercepted by law enforcement officers, who
testified to the conversations at trial. Olmstead contended that wiretapping con-
stituted an unreasonable search and seizure, and argued that the use of such
evidence was a violation of the fifth amendment in that it compelled him to
give evidence against himself. On the basis of the wiretap evidence, the defen-
dants were convicted of a conspiracy to violate the National Prohibition Act.
The Supreme Court held that evidence obtained through wiretapping was not
a violation of the fourth amendment, saying: "The Amendment itself shows that
the search is to be of material things-the person, the house, his papers or his
effects." 21 The Court classified conversation as an intangible object not entitled
to constitutional protection, and refused to extend the protection of the fourth
amendment except to those cases in which the seizure of evidence was accom-
panied by an actual, physical trespass on the premises of the objecting party.22
Although the Court refused to include conversation within the scope of the
fourth amendment, it implied that Congress could enact legislation to protect the
secrecy of telephone messages by making them inadmissible in federal criminal
trials..28 In 1934, perhaps as a reaction to the unpopular Olmstead doctrine,
24
14. Id. at 392.
15. Id. at 398.
16. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920). See also Marron
v. United States, 275 U.S. 192, 196 (1927); United States v. Lefkowitz, 285 U.S. 452, 464(1932).
17. Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949). There, the Court, after declaring that the
"security of one's privacy against arbitrary intrusion by the police . . . (is) implicit in
'the concept of ordered liberty,'" Id. at 27, nevertheless based its decision on other con-
siderations. It held that in a prosecution in a state court for a state crime, the fourth
amendment did not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search
and seizure. Id. at 33.
18. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
19. Id. at 655.
20. 277 U.S. 438 (1961).
21. Id. at 464.
22. Id. at 464-65.
23. Id. at 466.
24. While some feel that the statute was passed in reaction to Olmstead, there is no
457
BUFFALO LAW REVIEW
Congress passed the Federal Communications Act.2 5 Section 605 of this Act
prohibited the interception and divulgence in federal trials of evidence obtained
through wiretapping, 26 and thereafter, cases involving the use of wiretapping,
whether by federal or state officials, were disposed of under this section. Any
further constitutional arguments concerning the use of electronic eavesdropping
were delayed until 1942.27
Justice Brandeis, dissenting in Olmstead, had prophesized that
[t]he progress of science in furnishing the Government with means of
espionage is not likely to stop with wiretapping. Ways may someday be
developed by which the Government, without removing papers from
secret drawers, can reproduce them in court, and by which it will be
enabled to expose to a jury the most intimate occurrences of the
home.... Can it be that the Constitution affords no protection against
such invasions of individual security?28
Fourteen years later, the first "electronic eavesdropping ' 29 case reached the
Supreme Court in Goldman v. United States.30 Federal agents used a detecta-
phone placed against a partition wall between two offices to overhear conversa-
tions of the petitioners.31 On the basis of evidence obtained in this manner,
petitioners were convicted on a conspiracy to violate the National Bankruptcy
Act. In affirming the conviction, the Supreme Court adhered to the Olmstead
doctrine, reasoning that the use of a detectaphone to overhear conversations was
not a violation of the petitioners' rights under the fourth amendment,"2 since
there was no trespass 33 and no seizure of tangible evidence. The Court also
discarded the petitioners' contention that the two cases should be distinguished
evidence of such a cause-effect relationship. See Note, Eavesdropping and the Constitution:
a Reappraisal of the Fourth Amendment Framework, 50 Minn. L. Rev. 378, 388 (1965).
25. 47 U.S.C. ch. 5 (1964).
26. 47 U.S.C. § 605 (1964) [hereinafter referred to as section 605] provides: "no per-
son not being authorized by the sender shall intercept any communications and divulge
or publish the existence, contents, substance, purport, effect, or meaning of such intercepted
communication to any person . . . ." See Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937),
which construed the statute, regardless of the intent of Congress in passing it, as rendering
inadmissible in federal proceedings any evidence obtained through the use of wiretapping.
27. For a general discussion of wiretapping under section 605, and the development
of the law under the statute, see S. Dash, R. Schwartz & R. Knowlton, The Eavesdroppers,
386-406, 411-16 (1959); Symposium, The Wiretapping-Eavesdropping Problem: Reflections
on The Eavesdroppers, 44 Minn. L. Rev. 813 (1960); Westin, The Wiretapping Problem:
An Analysis and a Legislative Proposal, 52 Colum. L. Rev. 165 (1952); See also J. Schuster,
supra note 9, at 73-109, 168-202.
28. 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928).
29. Electronic eavesdropping as used in this context is what is commonly referred to as
a "bug," or any electronic device such as a microphone, designed to intercept conversations
between two or more persons in one place. It is to be distinguished from wiretapping insofar
as the latter method of electronic surveillance is designed to intercept telephone or telegraph
communications. For a discussion of the different types of eavesdropping and wiretapping
devices see S. Dash, R. Schwartz & R. Knowlton, supra note 27, at 305-79.
30. 316 U.S. 129 (1942).
31. Id. at 131-32.
32. Id. at 135.
33. The Court rejected the petitioner's contention that the evidence was tainted because
of an initial trespass to install another. device which subsequently failed to work, since
the trespass did not aid materially in the use of the detectaphone. Id. at 134-35.
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on the ground that the conversations were intended to be confined within the
room, while in Olmstead the voices were to be projected beyond the room. The
Court said,
We think... the distinction is too nice for practical application of the
Constitutional guarantee, and no reasonable or logical distinction can
be drawn between what federal agents did in the present case, and state
officers did in the Olmstead case.34
The rule that the fourth amendment protected only "tangible" objects was later
rejected in Irvine v. California.3 5 There, a listening device was placed in the
home of petitioner, and later moved to different rooms, by a series of unlawful
entries. The Supreme Court denounced the conduct of the police officers as a
violation of the fourth amendment, saying that breaking into a home, secreting
such a device and then listening to the conversations of the occupants was "al-
most incredible." 36 Yet the petitioner's conviction was upheld on the then valid
ground that evidence seized in violation of the fourth amendment was neverthe-
less admissible in state courts.3 7 The decision presaged what was to be the
Court's attitude in Silverman v. United States.38 In Silverman, the police inserted
a microphone with a spike attached to it into a party wall, until it made contact
with a heating duct serving the petitioners' house. Employed in this manner, the
device converted their entire heating system into a conductor of sound, enabling
the officers to overhear conversations taking place on both floors of the house.
Testimony of the officers describing incriminating conversations overheard in this
manner was admitted in evidence, and played a substantial part in the peti-
tioners' convictions. The Supreme Court reversed the convictions, implicitly re-
jecting the Olmstead doctrine that the fourth amendment prohibits only the
seizure of tangible objects. This was explicitly asserted in a later case, wherein
the Court said, "It follows from our holding in Silverman that the fourth amend-
ment may protect against the overhearing of verbal statements as well as against
the more traditional seizure of 'papers and effects.' "39 Thus, the fourth amend-
ment's protection was extended to intangible objects in the nature of conversa-
sations.
However, the Court's decisions involving eavesdropping and wiretapping
have, until recently, underminded only the tangibility aspect of the Olmstead
rule. The Court's consistent refusal to reconsider other aspects of Olmstead and
Goldmian led tO the development of a standard requiring that there be a "tres-
34. Id. at 135.
35. 347 U.S. 128 (1954).
36. Id. at 132.
37. Id. at 132-33. The rule applied in this case has, of course, been rendered invalid
by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961). See text accompanying supra note 19.
38. 365 U.S. 505 (1960).
39, Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471, 485 (1962). See also Lopez v. United
States, 373 U.S. 427, 460 (1963) where the Court stated that "we have held that the fruits
of electronic surveillance, although intangible, are within the reach of the Fourth Amend-
ment... 2
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pass" into a "constitutionally protected area"40 in order to hold the subsequent
eavesdropping an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of the fourth
amendment. Thus, an unlawful entry in order to install an eavesdropping device
would have been a trespass in violation of the fourth amendment. 41 On the other
hand, a radio transmitter concealed on the person of an informer did not con-
stitute a "trespass" under the Olmstead and Goldman doctrines.42 At the same
time as this "trespass standard" was being so tenaciously supported, it was
being diluted into a most superficial doctrine, the Court having held that an un-
lawful entry onto the premises need not be made. A "spike mike" driven into a
wall for the purpose of eavesdropping constituted an unlawful trespass into a
constitutionally protected area.43 Similarly, a "trespass" was accomplished when
a listening device pierced an adjoining wall no more than a fraction of an inch.44
Once the use of eavesdropping coupled with a "trespass" became recognized
as an unreasonable search and seizure, 45 the rule of Mapp v. Ohio was made
applicable, excluding the use of such evidence in state as well as federal courts.40
This "trespass standard," therefore, became the basis for decisions in state cases
involving eavesdropping, wherein the courts followed the rationale of the Su-
preme Court.47
Ill. RATIONALE OF Berger AND Katz
A. Unconstitutionality of Section 813-a
In Berger v. New York,48 the Court invalidated New York's eavesdropping
statute49 by holding that it did not comply with fourth amendment standards
40. What are considered to be constitutionally protected areas have been indicated
in Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920) (a business office); Silver-
man v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1960) (a home) ; United States v. Jeffers, 342 U.S. 48
(1951) (a hotel room); Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257 (1960) (an apartment);
Brinegar v. United States, 338 U.S. 160 (1949) (an automobile). See also Hoffa v. United
States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966).
41. Irvine v. California, 347 U.S. 128 (1954). The lower court's judgment of conviction
was affirmed on other grounds. See supra note 37 and accompanying text.
42. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952). See also Lopez v. United States,
373 U.S. 427 (1963). The issues presented in these cases involve the use of a device by a
party to the conversation to record and/or transmit the conversation to another. This
type of eavesdropping has been distinguished by the Court from third-party eavesdropping,
since the person whose conversation is being recorded speaks voluntarily and directly to
the person doing the recording and thereby runs the risk that what he says will be
repeated or testified to in court. The Court has reasoned that the victim of participant
eavesdropping is a victim only of his own "misplaced confidence." See Westin Science,
Privacy and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66 Colum. L. Rev. 1209, 1244-46
(1966).
43. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1960).
44. Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964). The Court reversed without opinion a
conviction wherein evidence had been obtained through the use of a listening device which
was inserted into the adjoining wall to "about the depth of a thumbtack." 204 Va. 275,
281-82; 130 S.E.2d 437, 442 (1963).
45. Silverman v. United States, 365 U.S. 505 (1960); Irvine v. California, 347 U.S.
128 (1954) (dictum); Clinton v. Virginia, 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (mem.).
46. See supra notes 18-19 and accompanying text.
47. See, e.g., People v. Grossman, 45 Misc. 2d 557, 257 N.Y.S.2d 266 (Co. Ct. 1965);
rev'd, 27 A.D.2d 572, 276 N.Y.S.2d 168 (2d Dept. 1966); rev'd, 20 N.Y.2d 346, 229 N.E.2d
589, 287 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1967); Clinton v. Virginia, 204 Va. 275, 130 S.E.2d 437 (1963);
rev'd 377 U.S. 158 (1964) (mem.).
48. 388 U.S. 41 (1967).
49. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a [hereinafter referred to as section 813-a].
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of particularity. justice Harlan, in delivering the opinion of the Court, main-
tained that particularity as to conversations and the particular offense involved
is especially necessary in an eavesdropping warrant (or ex parte order) because
such a technique necessarily "involves an intrusion on privacy that is broad in
scope."'  New York's statute, which authorized ex parte orders for eavesdrop-
ping, rather than requiring such specificity so as to prevent unauthorized inva-
sions of privacy, actually permitted general searches by electronic devices. Not
only was the statute lacking in the particularity requirements, but it was held to
be defective in other respects. The statute failed to require a new showing of
probable cause for each extension of the order and failed to require a termination
of the authorization once the conversation sought was seized. Furthermore, the
statute did not require that notice of the eavesdropping be served upon the
aggrieved party, not did it require any showing of special facts which would
overcome the necessity for such notice.5 1 The Court did not reach the question
of the validity of eavesdropping performed without a trespass. In fact, the Court
refused to reconsider its holding in Goldman, simply citing it as an example of
the valid use of an eavesdropping device, sustained by the Court in previous
cases.
52
Consequently, while the Berger Court seemingly held to the traditional
standards, in holding to the trespass standard, the significance of the case seems
to be the fact that underlying the rationale of the decision is a recognition of a
constitutional right to be free from unwarranted governmental intrusion on one's
privacy.
B. Rejection of the Trespass Theory
The advance of electronics has led to the development of highly effective
means of eavesdropping which do not require a physical trespass onto a sus-
pect's property in order to intercept his conversations. 53 The trespass standard
of Olmstead and Goldman is inadequate when viewed in light of these modern
methods of electronic surveillance and in light of the Silverman and Clinton
decisions."
The Supreme Court faced this problem squarely in Katz v. United States,55
wherein Justice Stewart, speaking for the majority, held that this "trespass
standard" is no longer controlling. This decision, in effect, entirely overrules
50. 388 U.S. 41, 56 (1967).
51. Id. at 58-60. The Court refused to consider the petitioner's contention that the
statute authorized a general search for "mere evidence," stating that this contention was
disposed of in Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294 (1967). Id. at 44 n.2. See Note, 17 Buffalo
L. Rev. 213 (1967). The question of whether the statute contained a satisfactory probable
cause requirement was not considered for two reasons. The petitioner and state agreed
that the "reasonable ground" requirement of the statute was equivalent to the fourth
amendment's "probable cause" requirement. Also, the question did not have to be deter-
mined since the statute was deficient on its face in other respects. Id. at 55.
52. 388 U.S. at 63.
53. S. Dash, R. Schwartz & R. Knowlton, The Eavesdroppers 330-70, (1959).
54. See text accompanying supra notes 43-44.
55. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
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Goldman, and negates what was the only remaining significance of that case and
the Olmstead case. In discarding the theory that some areas are constitutionally
protected, Justice Stewart held that the fourth amendment protects people, not
places: "what a person knowingly exposes to the public ... is not a subject of
fourth amendment protection" regardless of his presence in what might be
termed a constitutionally protected area. However, "what he seeks to preserve
as private, even in an area accessible to the public, may be constitutionally pro-
tected."5 6 Once it is recognized that the fourth amendment protects people, not
"areas," "it becomes clear that the reach of [the fourth] amendment cannot
turn upon the presence or absence of a physical intrusion into any given enclo-
sure."57 That is, the absence of a physical trespass has no constitutional signifi-
cance where the government's activity results in an unreasonable interference
with the privacy on which the individual justifiably relied, and where there is
no court authorized warrant to justify the search."
IV. IBrPLICATIONS OF THE RATIONALE
The language of the Court in Katz, in rejecting the trespass standard, raises
fundamental questions with respect to judging the validity of eavesdropping by
law enforcement officials. Undeniably, the individual has a right to be free from
unreasonable intrusion on his privacy. However, the question of what is "unrea-
sonable" can no longer be decided in terms of the presence or absence of an
unlawful trepass by law enforcement officers seeking to obtain information
through electronic surveillance.5 9
In neither Berger nor Katz did the Court formulate a general "constitu-
tional right to privacy," so as to preclude the use of eavesdropping as a means of
law enforcement. In fact, Justice Stewart in Katz specifically denied that the
fourth amendment guarantees the individual such a general right to privacy.00
Practically speaking, virtually every governmental action directed against an
individual interferes with his privacy to some extent. The question in each
case, said judge Stewart, "is whether that interference violates a command of
the Constitution." 61
Inherent in both the Berger and Katz decisions is the proposition that the
reasonableness of the eavesdropping depends on the existence of a valid warrant
in compliance with the fourth amendment, analogous to a search warrant for
tangible goods.6 2 The Court in both cases ruled that if an eavesdropping war-
rant is to comply with fourth amendment standards, it must contain all the pro-
cedural safeguards currently required for a search warrant for tangible goods.
These include the necessity of probable cause for the issuance of the warrant and
56. Id. at 351, 352.
57. Id. at 353.
58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id. at 350, 351.
61. Id. at 350, n.5.
62. 388 U.S. at 58-59, 63. 389 U.S. at 355-59.
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a particular description of the "thing" to be seized.63 It has been argued that no
eavesdropping warrant could describe with sufficient particularity the conversa-
tions to be seized since the conversations have not yet come into existence.6 4
On the contrary, it is submitted that a carefully drawn warrant could contain
the specificity required by the "warrants clause" of the fourth amendment.
Like the search warrant, it can describe the object of the search by specifically
stating the nature of the conversations sought, and the crime to which they will
relate, thereby reducing the danger of an indiscriminate search for incriminating
evidence.
While it may be possible for an eavesdropping warrant to provide the
requisite protections under the warrants clause, the initial invasion of privacy
necessitates additional protections within the traditional framework. Electronic
surveillance is a method of search and seizure which the framers of the Con-
stitution could not have considered, and society's demand for effective means
of law enforcement is at least as insistent as the individual's right to be "let
alone."0 5 The standard by which the Supreme Court has traditionally distin-
guished the reasonableness of the invasion of privacy by electronic means, i.e.,
the presence or absence of a physical trespass, is no longer valid as a result of
Katz. Consequently, a new standard is necessary by which to judge the reason-
ableness of the search by electronic means. An expanded concept of probable
cause might provide such a standard.66 It would not be unreasonable to require
that law enforcement officers, in applying for a warrant, assert facts showing
that the information sought is necessary in the investigation of a specified
crime, that all other reasonable alternative means of obtained the information
have been exhausted, and that there is a strong probability that the information
sought will be obtained through the use of electronic surveillance techniques.
Justice Stewart hinted at such a standard in his concurring opinion in Berger.
He recognized that "the need for particularity and evidence of reliability in the
showing [of probable cause] required when judicial authorization is sought for
electronic eavesdropping is especially great."16 7 According to Justice Stewart,
the fourth amendment requires that the showing of justification match the degree
of intrusion. Since electronic eavesdropping is such a broad invasion of privacy,
the showing of probable cause must therefore meet a "precise and rigorous
standard."6 8 A requirement that the government's need to use electronic sur-
veillance be demonstrably superior to the individual's right to be free from
such an invasion of privacy would effectively limit its use to those few cases
where such a showing could be made. It is suggested that a total prohibition
63. U.S. Const. amend. IV.
64. See Note, 18 S.C.L.Q. 835 (1966); But see Comment, 66 Colum. L. Rev,' 355, 375
(1966). See also, Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 365 (1967) (Black, J., dissenting).
65. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 476 (1927); (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
66. It should be noted that the probable cause question, certified for review in the
Berger case, was not discussed to any great extent. The constitutionality of N.Y. Code
Crim. Proc. § 813-a was decided on other grounds.
67. 388 U.S. at 69. Cf. Camara v. Mun. Ct. of San Francisco, 387 U.S. 523 (1967).
68. 388 U.S. at 69.
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of electronic eavesdropping could provide little more protection for the
individual than an expanded application of such a probable cause standard in
the issuance of the eavesdropping warrant. In fact, a total prohibition would
deprive the government of a useful tool of law enforcement in those cases
where the need for its use could be clearly demonstrated.
V. PossIBLE EXTENSION OF THE RATIONALE
With the rejection of the trespass standard, there appears to be reason to
extend the fourth amendment's protection to search and seizure by means of
wiretapping and some forms of participant eavesdropping.09
A. Wiretapping
Wiretapping was distinguished from third-party eavesdropping solely by
reason of the trespass standard. That is, since there was no actual, physical,
trespass into a constitutionally protected area, a search by this method, even
without a warrant, was not an unreasonable search and seizure in violation of
the fourth amendment.7 0 Katz indicates, however, that because the trespass
standard no longer governs, such a distinction is no longer valid. Therefore, it
can be argued that wiretapping should be made subject to the same standards
as third-party eavesdropping.
While wiretapping evidence is inadmissible in federal courts by reason
of section 605 of the Federal Communications Act,71 this exclusionary rule
has not been extended to the states.72 In Schwartz v. Texas, 3 the Supreme
Court stated that although introduction of wiretap evidence in the state courts
would be a violation of a federal statute, this was simply a factor for states to
consider in formulating rules of evidence for their own use.74 Yet the Court
held that any interception and divulgence by the states of telephone communi-
cations, without the authorization of the sender, was a violation of section 605.75
However, under the Olmstead rule, such wiretapping was not an unreasonable
search and seizure in violation of the fourth amendment, and therefore, though
committing a federal crime, the states have been permitted to use wiretap evi-
dence in cases in state courts. It is submitted that Katz, in rejecting the trespass
doctrine, has brought wiretapping within the purview of the fourth amend-
ment, thus making state wiretapping unconstitutional as well as illegal, unless
pursuant to a valid warrant. Consequently, apart from section 605, wiretapping
would be an unreasonable search and seizure, in violation of the fourth amend-
69. See supra note 42 for a distinction between participant eavesdropping and third-
party eavesdropping.
70. Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438 (1927).
71. Nardone v. United States, 302 U.S. 379 (1937). See supra notes 25-26 and accom-
panying text.
72. See, e.g., People v. Dinan, 11 N.Y.2d 350, 183 N.E.2d 689 (1962), cert. denied, 371
U.S. 877; Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
73. 344 U.S. 199 (1952).
74. Id. at 201.
75. Id. at 203.
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ment, unless accomplished pursuant to a valid warrant. However, since the
use of wiretapping evidence by the states is illegal, in violation of section
605,76 it would appear that no valid legal warrant can possibly be obtained
in order to comply with the requirements of the fourth amendment. Conse-
quently, it is suggested that all wiretapping is an unreasonable search and
seizure, and is forbidden in both state and federal practice by virtue of the
fourth amendment and section 605.
B. Participant Eavesdropping
Participant eavesdropping is that manner of electronic surveillance wherein
a party to a conversation with another either records the conversation, or
electronically transmits it to a third party. 7 In one type of participant eaves-
dropping case,78 an acquaintance engaged the petitioner in conversation. This
acquaintance was an informer, which fact was unknown to petitioner, and was
equipped with a miniature microphone which transmitted the conversation to
a government agent outside the premises who would not otherwise have been
able to overhear the conversation. This agent, who was not a participant to the
conversation, testified to the conversation at trial. In this case, the Court held
that there was no trespass involved, since the petitioner spoke voluntarily to
the informer. That the informer betrayed the petitioner's confidence by trans-
mitting the conversation to a third person was of no significance. It is sug-
gested that the rationale of Katz could logically be extended to a case of this
nature, where the person who testified as to the conversation, was able to over-
hear it only by virtue of the electronic device employed by the informer. Un-
doubtedly the petitioner sought to engage in a private conversation with his
acquaintance, and under the Katz rationale, such a conversation could be pro-
tected under the fourth amendment, unless the informer and agent were acting
pursuant to a valid search warrant.
Perhaps to be distinguished from this reasoning is the rationale of Lopez
v. United States.79 This case involved a conversation between the petitioner
and a known government agent, in which the agent recorded the conversation.
The recording was entered into evidence at petitioner's trial, in order to substan-
tiate the agent's testimony as to the conversation. The Court held that in this
case, there was really no "eavesdropping" involved. The Court reasoned that the
government did not use the device to overhear conversations it could not other-
wise have heard. The device was used "only to obtain the most reliable evidence
possible of a conversation in which the government's own agent was a partici-
pant and which that agent was fully entitled to disclose."80 The Court based
76. Id. at 201, 203; Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96, 99, 105 (1957). See also
Pugach v. Dollinger, 365 U.S. 458, 460 n.2 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
77. See On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952); Lopez v. United States, 373
U.S. 427 (1963).
78. On Lee v. United States, 343 U.S. 747 (1952).
79. 373 U.S. 427 (1963).
80. Id. at 439, 440.
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its reasoning on the fact that the petitioner had consented to speak with the
agent and the risk he took in offering a bribe to the agent "included the risk
that the offer would be accurately reproduced in court, whether by faultless
memory or mechanical recording."8 1
It is highly improbable that the Katz rationale would be extended to this
type of situation, where the participant to the conversation himself is the person
who discloses the contents of that conversation. This is a situation analogous
to one in which the party to the conversation is not equipped with any electronic
devices, but simply discloses a private conversation between himself and an-
other. Certainly it is a betrayal of a confidence, but it is doubtful that the
fourth amendment could be extended to make such action unlawful.8 2 It can be
argued, however, that the Katz rationale can be applied where a third party
is enabled to testify as to the nature of the conversation by reason of the use
of an electronic device by a participant to the conversation.
VI. EAVESDROPPING IN NEW YoRx
A. Historical Analysis
New York State has been regulating the use of electronic devices for the
interception of communications since 1938, by means of a state constitutional
provision8 3 which prohibited wiretapping except pursuant to a court order or
warrant. In 1942, section 813-a was added to the Code of Criminal Procedure
84
in order to implement this section of the Constitution, by providing procedural
requirements under which such a warrant could be obtained. Both provisions
were directed solely to the regulation of wiretapping techniques. However, in
1957, an amendment to the Penal Law made it a'<rime for any person except
a law enforcement officer "while acting lawfully and in his official capacity in
the investigation, detection or prosecution of crime . . .,,s8 to use electronic
devices such as microphones or tape recorders to overhear any conversation at
which he was not present.8 6 While these additions served to curtail the private
81. Id.
82. Cf. Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966) wherein the Court based its
decision on grounds similar to those relied on in Lopez, i.e., that the fourth amendment does
not protect a wrongdoer's misplaced belief that a person to whom he voluntarily confides
his wrongdoing will not reveal it. Id. at 302. See Osborne v. United States, 385 U.S. 323
(1966) wherein the Court indicated that the use of the recorder was a valid means of
surveillance because it was judicially authorized. This may imply that under similar circum-
stances, the Court would invalidate the use of such a recorder without any court authoriza-
tion.
83. N.Y. Const. art. I, § 12, provides:
,[T]he right of the people to be secure against unreasonable interception of
telephone and telegraph communications shall not be violated and ex parte orders
or warrants shall issue only upon oath or affirmation that there is reasonable
grounds to believe that evidence of crime may be thus obtained, and identifying the
particular means of communication and particularly describing the person or persons
whose communications are to be intercepted and the purposes thereof.
84. N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-a (1942), as amended, [1958] N.Y. Sess. Laws
ch. 676, § 1.
85. [1957] N.Y. Sess. Laws ch. 881, § I.
86. Id.
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use of eavesdropping techniques, there was as yet no provision controlling the
official use of such methods.87 During the following year the Penal Law provi-
sions were revised to remedy this problem, by deleting the blanket authority in fa-
vor of law enforcement officers from the prohibtion against eavesdropping, per-
mitting it only if "pursuant to an ex parte order granted pursuant to section
813-a of the Code of Criminal Procedure."8 8 Moreover, section 813-a was made
applicable to eavesdropping as well as wiretapping.8 9 Regardless of the ille-
gality of the means of obtaining evidence, however, the common law rule of
admissibility remained unchanged, i.e., evidence, including eavesdropping evi-
dence, obtained by an officer without an order, or with a defective order, was
nevertheless admissible in a state criminal proceeding.9 0 This rule was revoked
in 1962, partially under the influence of Mapp,91 when evidence obtained
through unlawful eavesdropping was excluded from any "criminal action, pro-
ceeding or hearing" as well as from civil causes tried in state courts. 92
B. Application of Berger Rule to Wiretapping Under Section 813-a
The Court in Berger invalidated section 813-a, at least as it applied to
eavesdropping orders issued under the statute. Whether the Berger rule applied
also to wiretapping orders, issued under the same statute, Was recently decided
by the New York Court of Appeals in People v. Kdiser.9 3 Judge Keating,
speaking for the majority, held that the Berger decision affected only that
language of section 813-a which permitted a "trespassory invasion of the home
by general warrant, contrary to the Fourth Amendment."64 The court ruled that
the Supreme Court's language in Berger does not require the prohibition of
wiretapping orders issued under the statute. However, as a matter of policy, the
conditions set forth in Berger would be applied to wiretapping cases which
arise in the future. The main problem in Kaiser Was the retroactivity issue. The
Kaiser court rejected any contention that the exclusionary rule of Mapp should
be given retroactive effect to cases on direct appeal at the time of the Berger
decision. The court's rationale behind this rule was that the purpose of the
exclusionary rule, to which eavesdropping evidence is subject, "is deterrence
of future police conduct," 95 and applying Berger retroactively would not "undo
the violation of the defendant's rights Which have already taken place."9 6 There-
87. Also in 1957, § 345-a was added to the N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act, excluding the use
in a civil case of any evidence obtained through illegal wiretapping.
88. N.Y. Pen. Law §§ 739, 741 (now §§ 250.00, 10.00, respectively).
89. At the same time, N.Y. Code Crim. Proc. § 813-b, as amended (1957), was re-
vised in its entirety, allowing for electronic eavesdropping without a court order under
certain circumstances.
90. People v. Defore, 242 N.Y. 13, 150 N.E.2d 585 (1926); People v. Adams, 176
N.Y. 351, 68 N.E. 636 (1903), aff'd, 192 U.S. 585 (1904); People v. Katz, 201 Misc. 414,
114 N.Y.S.2d 360 (Co. Ct. 1952).
91. 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
92. N.Y. Civ. Prac. Act § 345-a (now N.Y. CPLR § 4506).
93. 21 N.Y.2d 86, 233 N.E.2d 818, 286 N.Y.S.2d 801 (1967).
94. Id. at 101, 233 NYE.2d at 827, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 813.
95. Id. at 98, 223 N.E.2d at 825, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 811.
96. Id.
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fore, the court decided it would apply the Berger rationale only "to those cases
in which the wiretapping or eavesdropping orders were issued after the date
of that decision." 97
Apart from the retroactivity problem of Kaiser it is apparent that the
Court of Appeals has dealt with Berger as applying only to the eavesdropping
provisions of section 813-a. Section 813-a, according to the Court, is valid as
it applies to wiretapping. However, it is suggested that this rationale is in-
valid when viewed in light of Katz.98 If Katz can be viewed as bringing wire-
tapping within the purview of the fourth amendment, the state's practice of
permitting wiretapping and the use of wiretap evidence pursuant to court order
would not only be a violation of a federal statute and therefore illegal,00 but
would amount to an unreasonable search and seizure under the fourth amend-
ment, since no valid, legal warrant could be obtained. It is suggested, therefore,
that even if Berger did not apply to wiretapping under section 813-a, the
Katz decision may very well extend to such wiretapping practices.
C. New York's Proposal: Article 370
While the Supreme Court in Berger implied that a valid eavesdropping
statute could be drafted to comply with the fourth amendment requirements,
0 0
it did not delineate any specific guidelines for drafting such a statute. Therefore,
the essential requirements of any such statute are indicated only by the defects
in section 813-a as noted by the Court.
The proposed Criminal Procedure Law would replace section 813-a with
an article setting forth the procedures to be followed at each phase of eaves-
dropping, from application through termination. 01 The article is not restricted
solely to remedying the defects of section 813-a, but includes as well a number
of restrictions not specifically demanded by the Berger decision. 10 " The article
stresses particularity of description, even to the point of requiring a description
of the nature of the conversation sought to be overheard. 10 3 There must be
reasonable ground to believe that a particular crime is involved and that a
conversation of a particular person will occur. This conversation must consti-
tute "cogent evidence of such crime" 0 4 and be material to a particular investi-
97. Id. at 99, 233 N.E.2d at 825, 286 N.Y.S.2d at 811. See also People v. Morehouse, 21
N.Y.2d 66, 77, 233 N.E.2d 705, 711, 286 N.Y.S.2d 657, 665 (1967). In refusing to give retro-
active effect to Berger, the court overruled People v. Grossman, 20 N.Y.2d 346, 229
N.E2d 589, 283 N.Y.S.2d 12 (1967).
98. See text accompanying supra note 76.
99. Benanti v. United States, 355 U.S. 96 (1957), Schwartz v. Texas, 344 U.S. 199
(1952).
100. 388 U.S. at 63.
101. Proposed N.Y. Crim. Proc. Law art. 370.
102. The revisers' notes state that one such restriction is the requirement that there
be no reasonable alternative means for obtaining this information. But see Statement of
Dist. Att'y Frank S. Hogan, N.Y. County, on July 12, 1967, at the Hearings on S. 675
Before the Subcomm. on Criminal Laws and Procedures of the Senate Comm. on the Judi-
ciary, 90th Cong., 1st Sess. (1967), where he stated that this restriction is implicitly re-
quired by Berger, in the Court's treatment of "exigent circumstances."
103. N.Y. Proposed Crim. Proc. Law § 370.15, 2(c).
104. It should be noted that the word "cogent" has never been used in previous
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gation or prosecution.'0° The article seeks to limit the eavesdropping to certain
stated hours, and in any event terminates at the end of fifteen days. 06 The
authority to eavesdrop under Article 370 automatically terminates once the
described conversations have been heard and recorded, notwithstanding the
fifteen day limit. This reduces the length of time an eavesdropping device may
be used if the described conversations are immediately overheard. 0 7 Any
renewal of the warrant must be based on a present showing of necessity.'08 The
article requires that return of the warrant be made to the issuing judge, 0 9
though no such service of return need be made on the aggrieved party."10
Another point to be considered as an element of a valid search and
seizure is notice. Section 813-a contained no requirement for notice of any kind,
and the Supreme Court in Berger considered this a defect in the statute. The
proposed Criminal Procedure Law attempts to remedy this defect by including a
requirement that notice be given in every eavesdropping case."' This required
notice must be served on the "owner, lessee, or occupant of the premises in
which the eavesdropping device is to be installed,' "112 though the person served
with notice need not be the person whose conversations are to be overheard.
For example, a hotel owner may be served with notice that an eavesdropping
device is to be installed in a room on the premises. It is submitted that this
provision is inadequate, insofar as it does not require notice to be served on
the aggrieved party. However, this defect is partially remedied by another
provision requiring that the aggrieved party be served with notice prior to
trial if the information obtained is to be used as evidence at trial, and would
be suppressible if unlawfully obtained." 8. One of the major purposes of a
notice requirement is to afford the aggrieved party an opportunity to move to
suppress evidence unlawfully obtained. This provision of the Criminal Procedure
Law may adequately serve that purpose and yet not render electronic eaves-
dropping totally ineffectual, as would be the result if notice to the aggrieved
party were required in every case before the "search and seizure" took place.
The proposed statute permits prior notice to be postponed in those instances
where a showing.of exigent circumstances can be made to justify such post-
ponement. 114 There seems to be no reason why notice may not be postponed
when the necessity for such postponement is clearly shown to the court, assum-
statutes as a modification of the word evidence, and there may be question as to the
intention of the Committee in inserting this adjective into the proposed statute.
105. N.Y. Proposed Crim. Proc. Law § 370.15, 2 (a-c).
106. Id. §§ 370.15 2(e), 370.35.
107. Id. § 370.35.
108. Id. § 370.40.
109. Id. § 370.50.
110. However, if the aggrieved party is a defendant, he must be notified of the
prosecution's intention to use eavesdropping evidence, before the commencement of trial.
N.Y. Proposed Crim. Proc. Law § 375.30.
111. N.Y. Proposed Crim. Proc. Law § 370.50.
112. Id. § 370.50(1).
113. Id. § 375.30(1).
114. Id. § 370.50(2).
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ing, of course, that such notice will be served on the aggrieved party sometime
prior to trial, to afford him an opportunity to move for suppression of evidence
which he contends was illegally obtained. It is submitted, however, that a
strict standard of necessity must be developed by the courts in determining the
justification for postponement of notice. Otherwise, the "exigent circumstances"
rule Would be nothing more than a mere sham, and would not be a remedy for
the "no notice" defect in section 813-a as mentioned by the Court in Berger.
It should be realized that any eavesdropping device will necessarily inter-
cept the conversations of all persons who speak within its range. This will be
true regardless of how carefully the statute is limited or the use of the device
is supervised. The necessity of describing the particular conversations sought
will serve to limit the evidentiary use of the recorded conversations. 1 However,
statutory protection must be provided to prohibit any use of the unrelated
conversations which are also intercepted. Particularity in a search warrant for
tangible items is required to prevent the seizure of one thing under a warrant
describing another." 6 Similarly, under an eavesdropping warrant, police must
be prevented from using, directly or indirectly, the conversations of persons
not named in the warrant, for information obtained thereby would be the
"fruit" of an illegal search." 7 This requirement is an elusive one, and probably
the most difficult to enforce. That is, it would be most difficult to discover
whether these unrelated conversations had been used in the indirect
manner, and therefore the "general invasion of privacy" which would accom-
pany the execution of any eavesdropping warrant might be a fatal defect in
many cases.
VII. CONCLUSION
With the decisions in Berger and Katz, the Supreme Court has, in essence,
modernized the law applicable to electronic eavesdropping. In doing so, it has
swept away old standards and clarified others. Yet the decisions leave certain
questions unanswered, such as the questions of wiretapping and participant
eavesdropping. It is evident from the development of the law and the course the
Court is taking on this subject that the Supreme Court has been, and is still,
struggling with the concept of a right of privacy for the individual, and whether
this right is guaranteed by the Constitution. In this age of little privacy when
many see an Orwellian "Big Brother" in every governmental intrusion on one's
privacy, the Supreme Court is faced with a difficult task in attempting to achieve
the delicate balance between society's need for effective law enforcement and
the individual's right to be free from governmental intrusion on his privacy.
The number of cases in which eavesdropping or wiretapping evidence is ad-
mitted is but a fraction of the total number of eavesdrops or wiretaps accom-
115. N.Y. CPLR § 4506 will exclude the use as evidence of any conversations overheard
which were not described in the warrant.
116. Marron v. United States, 275 U.S. 192 (1927). But see Harris v. United States,
331 U.S. 145, 155 (1947).
117. Cf. Silverthorne Lumber Co. v. United States, 251 U.S. 385 (1920).
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plished by law enforcement officers throughout the country. The real victim
of an invasion of privacy is the person whose home has been "bugged" or whose
telephone has been "tapped," where the information obtained evidences no
criminal activity, and offers no leads to the police in crime detection. To avoid
this problem, and to protect the individual from less than diligent methods of
law enforcement, the strictest standards must be established if eavesdropping
is to be permitted. While a certain amount of inconvenience will result from a
more restricted use of electronic methods of surveillance, the individual will be-
assured of the protection of his right to be "let alone."
MARY E. BISANTZ
MEDICAL MALPRACTICE-THE MEDICAL AND LEGAL
ASPECTS OF THE POST-PROSTATECTOMY URINARY
INCONTINENCE SUIT
INTRODUCTION
John Starr had worked as a carpenter and then as a carpenter foreman in
Florida, Georgia and Virginia for over twelve years. In 1956 he had become
afflicted with mild prostatitis, an inflammation of the prostate gland, and had
been treated successfully with antibiotics by his family doctor. When the condi-
tion recurred in 1960, Starr went to see Dr. Albert Fregosi, who also treated him
conservatively with antibiotics, but the symptoms soon returned. Dr. Fregosi
determined that an obstruction of the urinary tract might be the cause of Starr's
illness, and he decided upon surgery. In early May of 1961, when Starr was forty-
six years of age, the doctor performed a transurethral resection, by which he
removed part of Starr's prostate gland, the apparent cause of the obstruction.
Following the operation Starr was unable to urinate. Fregosi determined that,
because of tissues which had not been removed during the course of the first
operation, a second surgical procedure was necessary. Subsequent to this
procedure, performed in late May of 1961, Starr complained consistently of
urinary incontinence, the inability to hold his water, both at home and at
work, He had to wear a plastic bag, diapers and pads, and a penile clamp.
However, he found that there was leakage even through the clamp when he was
under stress.1
During the next year and one half, Starr continued to have intermittent
prostate infection and incontinence. He saw a number of doctors and urologists
about his condition. Two of the doctors treated him with drugs for about eight
months, but they were unable to determine the reason for Starr's urinary in-
continence. Finally Starr was sent to Dr. Tom Florence, an Atlanta, Georgia
1. Brief for Appellant at 7-13, Starr v. Fregosi, 370 F.2d 15 (5th Cir. 1966).
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